The F-15EX Eagle II is among a few planes that bridge the gap between old-school fighter power and the requirements of modern-day combat. If you ask one person, it would be called a blast from the past with minimal changes, and if you ask another, it would be the key to the future. However, the truth is that it is not an outdated or temporary solution but a painstakingly developed, technologically advanced aircraft that caters to the intricate complexities of today’s air battle.

Its heritage goes back to the original F-15 Eagle, which first flew in the early 1970s. Then, the F-15 was designed to own the dogfight environment, relying on energy-maneuverability theory to provide unrivaled agility. Over the years, it developed through variants such as the F-15C/D and multirole F-15E Strike Eagle, each incorporating new technology to get ahead of the threat. When the U.S. Air Force ordered the F-15EX for the first time in 2020, the mission was simple: exchange old F-15Cs/Ds with a more capable, updated plane capable of conducting much more than air-to-air combat.

In terms of performance, the F-15EX is a beast. With the ability to achieve Mach 2.5, it’s the fastest fighter on U.S. production lines today. Its two General Electric F110-GE-129 engines produce almost 30,000 pounds of thrust each and take it up to a top altitude of 60,000 feet. Digital fly-by-wire flight controls—introduced in the F-15 family—provide the pilots with even narrower handling and safety margins, enabling them to perform wild maneuvers comparable to more advanced thrust-vectoring designs. Large touchscreen screens and dual Digital Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems in the cockpit provide pilots with a clear picture of the battlefield.

Where the Eagle II shines is in carrying a massive payload—over 29,000 pounds of ordnance. That can be a dozen AMRAAM missiles or even 22-foot-long hypersonic missiles. With AMBER racks, it can hold up to 22 air-to-air missiles, which means it is an unparalleled “missile truck” for supporting stealth fighters by bringing raw firepower from afar. Its open architecture for mission systems allows it to rapidly add new sensors and weapons as technology evolves.

Its electronic warfare is equally impressive. Its AN/APG-82(V)1 AESA radar has long-range detection and multitarget tracking, while its EPAWSS (Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System) gives it enhanced threat detection and countermeasures. Brig. Gen. Jason Voorheis called EPAWSS a huge step forward in survivability and lethality, capable of finding, identifying, and jamming adversary systems on its own. Because it’s software-centric, it can be updated in real-time to remain effective against shifting threats.

F-15EX is not limited to a single role. While air dominance is part of its DNA, it’s also being considered for missions from electronic attack to manned-unmanned teaming. It has the potential to be outfitted with Next Generation Jammer Pods, which will perform some of the electronic warfare missions previously reserved for other aircraft. Its two-seat configuration makes room for a backseat weapons officer to control drone formations, stretching the jet’s reach without taking it into the most dangerous areas.

Most unorthodox of all is its possibility as an air refueler at high speeds. With “buddy” tanker pods in progress, the F-15EX could top off stealth fighters in much closer proximity to the fight than big, vulnerable tankers can, resupplying the front line and keeping it engaged.

From a cost and logistics perspective, the F-15EX is a huge plus. It’s much cheaper to purchase and maintain compared to stealth-specific aircraft, and it uses roughly 70% of its components from previous F-15s. It takes just two weeks to rotate an F-15C pilot into an F-15EX, which means very little downtime for operational squadrons. The Air Force intends to purchase at least 144 of them, giving it a robust fighter force without being dependent solely on high-maintenance stealth squadrons.

Internationally, the jet has attracted interest from a number of allies. Israel ordered 50 F-15IAs, Indonesia ordered 24 F-15IDNs, and Poland is considering its position. Qatar and Saudi Arabia already have advanced models of the Eagle, further cementing the type’s position as a reliable and versatile platform.

Its lack of stealth is usually criticized as its greatest failing, particularly in light of current long-range air defenses. That’s missing the point, however—the F-15EX isn’t meant to replace stealth planes. Rather, it augments them, performing roles where stealth isn’t quite as necessary while bringing enormous firepower, electronic warfare assistance, and adaptable mission envelopes. Once the airspace is secured, it can take up much of the workload, allowing stealth platforms to be reserved for the missions only they are suited to.

The blending of proven airframe, state-of-the-art avionics, and advanced electronic warfare capabilities guarantees the F-15EX will be on the battlefield for years to come. In a world where responsiveness and flexibility are paramount, the Eagle II demonstrates that speed, payload, and flexibility are as important as stealth in forging air combat’s future.

The Littoral Combat Ship, or LCS, was first marketed as the next generation naval war, the versatile, modular warship that could perform even the most complex tasks like minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare while costing only a small fraction of what the traditional ships would have required. However, the LCS program is now a story to warn about: ambitious in plans, pricey in actuality, and giving the Navy a somewhat ambiguous past.

In the early 2000s, the Navy had to deal with the shrinking of its fleet and the upcoming retirement of many ships that dated back to the Cold War era. Therefore, it launched the LCS program. The concept was very straightforward: develop a diminutive, versatile, and combat-effective vessel that could be constructed quickly and at a low cost to perform simple tasks, leaving the larger ships free to engage in more complex operations. The idea was that each ship would cost about $400 million, roughly one-third the cost of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

What distinguished the LCS was its modularity. The vessels were also constructed for minimal crews—fewer than half of what a standard frigate demands—depending on automation and unmanned vehicles. As then-deputy defense secretary Bob Work pointed out, the strategy was innovative and untested, a radical break from traditional naval architecture.

But the desire to push forward outpaced available resources. The Navy steamed ahead with the LCS to production before there was a complete plan, bypassing many of the customary testing and evaluation phases. The first LCS went into service in 2008, years sooner than the typical Pentagon acquisition schedule. Bryan Clark of the Hudson Institute says the Navy’s urgency to innovate left few with the stomach to say “no” to added requirements as the program grew more complex.

Issues soon arose. The mission packages, long espoused as the LCS’s signature strength, were complicated to implement and frequently behind schedule. The anti-submarine package encountered sonar deployment problems, minesweeping systems fell behind schedule, and hull designs experienced transmission problems and cracking under high speeds—a critical issue for vessels designed to be fast-moving. Efforts to cycle specialized crews between ships also didn’t pan out, detracting from operational effectiveness.

The costs skyrocketed to an extent that was way beyond the original estimations. Even though the Navy was expecting the price for each ship not to exceed $250 million, the actual costs exceeded $500 million for each vessel, due to their mission packages being highly expensive. At the beginning, Congress was fully supportive of the Navy and approved the block-buy contracts for both the Freedom and Independence-class designs without much hesitation. On the other hand, with the passage of time, a considerable number of technical and maintenance issues have surfaced. In 2016, an extensive investigation was conducted because of the frequent engine faults, whereby the program’s reputation had already been damaged.

During that time, the strategic landscape was shifting. The LCS was designed for near-shore “brown water” operations, but China’s expanding anti-access, area denial capabilities made those missions more and more perilous. Several LCSs were retired after fewer than five years—far less than their planned 25-year life.

Experts calculated that the premature retirement accounted for about $7 billion in lost service time, not counting billions more in operating expenses that the Navy saved by retiring the ships.

For others, the choice to cut losses was painful but necessary. Former naval officer Bryan McGrath said maintaining the ships in commission would have been more expensive and less effective, especially in a possible high-end war. The American Enterprise Institute’s Mackenzie Eaglen noted the high yearly operating expenses—about $70 million per vessel—as another basis for why early retirement was financially astute.

However, the program was not a complete failure. The minesweeping package did finally achieve operational status, and in doing so performed a world-first by employing unmanned vehicles to sweep out minefields.

The LCS saga should be learned that naval innovation is a balancing act between trying to be the best and still being rooted in reality. Very often, without thorough testing, exact requirements, and a responsive approach to change driven by changing threats, even the most brilliant ideas may turn into a money sink. As it was put by a staffer of the Congress, the Navy could be a bit late in discovering the shortcomings of LCS, but the process of learning from them will be very important for the future fleet.

World War II marked the time when the development of aviation technology went through a huge change in the most rapid way possible. As each one of the fighting parties was trying to take the upper hand in the air, the engineers came up with the craziest, weirdest, and strangely innovative aircraft that no one had ever seen. They even blew the boundaries of human capabilities with these crafts and sometimes went beyond quite a few people’s understanding of sanity. These were ten of the most extraordinary and bizarre aircraft, and most importantly, with independent stories of ambition and genius.

10. Martin PBM-5A Mariner

The PBM-5A Mariner was one of America’s most powerful patrol bombers, even beating the legendary PBY Catalina at several tasks. Designed by the Glenn L. Martin Company, it boasted a gull wing that left its engines above the spray of salt, and retractable wing floats to cut drag. Its bomb bay lay hidden in the fuselage, so it could fly more quickly when weighed down with bombs. Subsequent versions were even equipped with jet-assisted take-off rockets for short, high-angle climbs—ideal for rescue missions in choppy seas. Staffed by nine and equipped with several .50-caliber cannons, the Mariner paid its dues in the Battle of the Atlantic by sinking ten German submarines. Of the over a thousand that were built, just one survives today.

9. Curtiss XP-55 Ascender

The XP-55 Ascender resembled something out of a science fiction strip—its engine was mounted behind the pilot, it featured a canard wing at the front, and dual vertical tails mounted at the end of its wings. The unorthodox “pusher” design was supposed to provide improved visibility and concentrate firepower in the nose. Unfortunately, it had unpredictable stalls and never produced the desired performance. Three were constructed, and two were destroyed in crashes. The one that remains is a testament to how far engineers would push things to experiment.

8. Vought V-173 “Flying Pancake”

The bizarrely endearing V-173 became known by its nickname due to its body being round and flat and its massive propellers—over sixteen feet in diameter each. Conceived by Charles Zimmerman, the plane was able to lift off over an extremely short distance, and with a powerful headwind, it could nearly fly vertically. Its peculiar shape created lift over its entire surface, which provided helicopter-like maneuverability in flight. Although testing was successful, the Navy’s interest was already turned toward more speed-oriented jet aircraft, and the Flying Pancake never entered production.

7. Focke-Wulf 190D “Long Nose”

Designated as the “Langnasen” to German airmen, the Focke-Wulf 190D was an interception-capable high-altitude fighter equipped with a liquid-cooled Jumo 213 engine. Its top speed was raised to approximately 440 mph with this improvement and enabled it to engage Allied bombers at altitude. Equipped with 20mm and 13mm cannons, it was a formidable foe, but wartime production interruptions meant that it was never produced in the quantities that could have made the difference. Now, only a few remain on display in museums. 

6. Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa (“Oscar”)

The Ki-43 Hayabusa, or “Peregrine Falcon,” was a long-legged and quick-flying fighter that surprised Allied pilots at the beginning of the war. Highly agile, it was one of Japan’s most ubiquitous fighters, with over 5,900 produced. Early models had no armor or self-sealing fuel tanks, but subsequent improvements corrected those limitations without destroying the plane’s legendary agility. There is only one complete example of the type preserved.

5. Mitsubishi A6M7 Reisen (Zero)

The Mitsubishi Zero was legendary enough for its speed and maneuverability, but the A6M7 model added even more capabilities. It was built for dive-bombing from smaller carriers with strengthened wings and bomb racks instead of a centerline fuel tank. This model was one of the last Zeros to fly, as the war went against the Japanese. Although more than ten thousand Zeros were produced in total, relatively few intact aircraft remain in original condition today.

4. Horten Ho 229

The Ho 229 was in a class by itself—a streamlined jet-propelled flying wing decades ahead of its time. Its unconventional shape cut both drag and radar signature, and its twin jet motors promised up to 600 mph speeds. The aircraft took to the air in prototype in 1944, but the war’s end came before it could go into production. Still, it was one of the most sophisticated ideas to come out of the war.

3. Messerschmitt Me 262

The Me 262 was the first operational jet fighter in the world, and when it emerged, it startled Allied pilots. It had a top speed of around 540 mph and nose-mounted heavy cannons, and could tear through bomber formations before the bombers had time to respond. Reliability and fuel shortages held it back from altering the war, but its design left a gigantic mark on postwar aircraft development.

2. Heinkel He 178 and He 280

The Heinkel He 178 is the first jet plane to have ever flown, which it did in 1939. Following on from this achievement, Heinkel produced the He 280, the first purpose-built turbojet fighter. With a top speed of in excess of 550 mph, the He 280 was a leading contender, but rival designs—such as the Me 262—got to production first. Nevertheless, these initial jets represented the beginning of a new age for flight.

1. Mitsubishi J8M1 Shusui / Ki-200

The number one position is held by the Mitsubishi J8M1 Shusui, a rocket-powered interceptor designed with Germany’s Me 163 Komet as its model. Developed to combat bombers at high altitudes, it was able to ascend to breathtaking heights in just minutes and achieve scorching speeds—but for only five minutes, as the fuel would then be depleted. Technical information from Germany came in pieces, so Japanese engineers had to improvise much of the development. Unfortunately, the prototype crashed during its initial test flight, and it killed the test pilot. The war broke out before the aircraft were further developed.

These planes are a testament to the daring experiments and risky leaps in technology that characterized WWII aviation. Some of them were breakthroughs, some failures, but all left their unique imprint on the history of aviation.

The Sukhoi Su-57 Felon was the Russian project to build a top-of-the-line stealth fighter of the fifth generation — a vehicle that contained a lot of sophisticated technology that should have brought Russian aerospace back into the headlines and competed against America’s best and most intelligent fighter aircraft, such as the F-22 and F-35. However, things have not been going great for the aircraft. Rather than achieving amazing success, the Su-57 has stumbled over delays, manufacturing issues, and uncertainties concerning its place in the rapidly changing military world.

The Su-57 project was started as early as the 2000s under the PAK FA program. It was to create a multi-role fighter that would dominate the air, attack targets on the ground, and perform reconnaissance. It featured stealth technology, a lot of lightweight composite materials, hidden armament bays, and cutting-edge avionics.

The plane was designed to be incredibly maneuverable in the air, with smart systems onboard — some went so far as calling the flight computer an “electronic co-pilot” — and radar spread all across the airframe to watch out for threats coming in from all angles.

Artificial intelligence was built into its communication and data systems so that pilots could get ahead of their competition and make fast decisions under difficult conditions. Russia’s state producers asserted that the technology made it possible for the plane to send encrypted information at high rates, helping to increase reconnaissance and combat effectiveness.

On paper, the Su-57 is impressive. It has a top speed of twice the speed of sound, a range of over 2,000 miles, and can accommodate hypersonic missiles and precise smart weapons. Its sensors can track multiple targets at once, and its artificial intelligence can learn from mission results to be a more effective tactician and help maintain the plane out of harm’s way. Its slender, angled shape with radar-absorbing materials and engines concealed within is intended to make it invisible to enemy radar, especially head-on.

But in reality, it has not been smooth sailing. Sanctions from the West have bitten Russia, keeping it from accessing key components like cutting-edge electronics and special materials employed in order to attain stealth. The Su-57’s radar, which was initially built based on German technology, is most affected. Efforts to replace these components with imports from other countries have not been straightforward, and there is doubt about the availability of these alternatives.

Because of these problems, very few Su-57s are operational. By late 2024, only about 22 had been delivered, including test and production models. Official targets for attaining higher numbers in subsequent years now seem unrealistic. Every Su-57 is a treasure — when one of them was hit in an attack in the Astrakhan region, it was losing an expensive part of Russia’s cutting-edge fighter capability. Replacing these planes is time-consuming and expensive, with limited spares, while Russia churns out more proven aircraft like the Su-30SM2 and Su-35S to fill gaps.

In action, the Su-57 has had a limited role in the war in Ukraine. Russia has been cautious about risking its precious few jets in contested airspace, not wanting to lose expensive, advanced technology and damage the jet’s global reputation. That self-restraint has meant the Su-57 has had little impact so far. Instead, Russia employs upgraded older jets, which may not be as advanced but are abundant and less expensive to repair.

Or vice versa, they have had to wait a considerable time before starting to export to foreign countries. Algeria is the first customer to buy six Su-57E fighter aircraft. Besides that, the pilots are training in Russia, and they’re talking about making more purchases. In part, it is a matter of doing what others in the region who have the most modern fighters are doing. Nevertheless, this order is the only one, and no big sales are expected. In 2018, India, which had originally intended to co-design a fighter jet with Russia, decided to withdraw, being dissatisfied with the stealth and electronic features of the Su-57. Few people can help but feel sympathetic towards the bad-boy reputation the aircraft got from the times it displayed its glaring weaknesses at airshows and from ongoing quality issues in the manufacturing. 

One of the contrasts between the Western competitors and the Russian fighter is the severity and visibility of the different issues with the Su-57. Just to name only one example, the U.S. already produces over a thousand F-35s globally at various locations, all controlled by a massive supply chain and quality assurance regime. While the F-22 and F-35 are the stealth/sensor tech standards of gold with histories of success in modern warfare and very stable flight, Russian planes, although said to be able to cancel out Western air defense, are still considered by most experts as far from being perfect in the stealth area.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin still regards the Su-57 as central to Russia’s military strategy over the long haul. The Kremlin interprets the Su-57 as a national pride masterpiece and a way to keep pace with other powers of similar calibre. However, as the sanctions proceed and with all the production difficulties, the Su-57 is more of a prestige program than a front-line game changer. The global arms market is watching, but for now, Russia’s leading-edge fighter is having trouble flying on the runway and worldwide.

On July 18, 2025, the sky over Minot, North Dakota, was transformed into a theatre for a dramatic and unsettling episode in American aviation history. After a spectacular overflight at the North Dakota State Fair, a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber was hard on the heels of a commercial airliner and a small private plane, such that it almost hit them. This event has since become a focal point for conversations about the complexities and fragilities of mixed military and civilian airspace management, particularly around less-trafficked airports.

 A B-52 based at Minot Air Force Base was wrapping up its officially authorized overflight when it went off track and started its landing approach at Minot International Airport, which triggered the incident. At that time, SkyWest Airlines Flight 3788, operating as a Delta Connection from Minneapolis, was on final approach with 76 passengers and four crew members.

The National Transportation Safety Board report – at its initial stage – states that the B-52 was on its briefed flight plan and was coordinated in advance with Minot Air Traffic Control as well as Dakota Radar Approach Control. The air traffic controller who was on duty, however, did not suggest to the B-52 crew that a commercial jet was inbound, nor did he warn the pilot of the airliner of the bomber’s whereabouts.

Just at that moment when the two aircraft locations were about to overlap, the SkyWest pilot suddenly saw the massive bomber coming up on his right side. Since he was given no warning, he did what he called later “an aggressive maneuver” to avoid a crash, in which he wrenched the regional jet into a quick turn that not only pushed him into their seat but also looked at the ground instead of the sky. Monica Green, a passenger seated near the front, remembered the quietness and uneasiness that gripped the plane as it made the steep bank and everyone realized in silence that something was not right. The pilot, letting his nervousness be heard, apologized to the passengers after landing, saying it was a surprise for him when it happened, and he did not receive any prior warning from air traffic control. 

The drama was not over with a near miss of a commercial jet. The B-52 came close to crashing with a light aircraft, a privately operated Piper PA-28-151, which was also flying around the airport under visual flight rules, less than a minute after the near-miss with the commercial jet. The detail that the bomber came within one-third of a mile of the Piper is only in the NTSB’s preliminary findings. Once again, the controller did not tell the crew on the B-52 that there was a smaller plane in the area.

The NTSB report describes a tower in Minot where both confusion and a breakdown in procedures were evident. As things stood, there was only one controller on duty, and he was in charge of visually managing all traffic because there was no radar; as a result, the work quickly went beyond his capacity.

Looking at transcripts of radio communications, it is clear that the controller had issued several confusing or delayed commands, and in one instance, had even to reverse the instructions because he had confused call signs. The local controller was also in charge of communicating with a regional FAA radar controller from Rapid City, South Dakota, before he could give out any instructions, and this procedure might have been the reason for the delays that occurred.

Jeff Guzzetti, an aviation safety consultant who has worked on the NTSB and FAA investigation cases, was very clear that the controller did not warn the Delta and Piper pilots early enough to turn the aircraft off and thus be able to keep a safe distance from the bomber. He added that the occurrence of three aircraft meeting each other at the very same time, combined with the unavailability of radar and the need for external coordination, escalated the situation quickly.

However, wonderfully, the three aircraft managed to land without any problems, and no one was injured. The NTSB’s initial report did not point fingers, but only stated that the B-52 was functioning within its limits and that the visual separation standard was followed by both the bomber and the Piper. Meanwhile, the Air Force stressed that it remains committed to safety and will cooperate fully with the ongoing investigations, as was also confirmed by the FAA, which has already set up its own inquiry, commenting that Minot’s tower is run by private contractors and not by the agency’s staff.

This is an incident that occurred amidst the implementation of military and civilian airspace coordination strategies, which have been under increased focus after several accidents and close calls that have been reported in recent years.

The Minot event shows how airports with no radar, and particularly smaller ones, are handling the situation under the still present military operations that have now been overlapped with commercial and private aviation, and thus are facing the challenges of such a convergence. While the NTSB and FAA are conducting their investigations, aviation is still struggling with how to prevent this from happening again as the skies get more and more crowded, especially in those areas where the risk is the highest and there is very little room for error.