If you have been keeping up with defense news lately, hypersonic is the one word that has been repeatedly mentioned. Hypersonic weapons are those whose speed exceeds five times that of sound. However, to be extremely fast is only a small part of the story. What really causes the biggest fear in war planners is the fact that they are able to adjust their trajectory at the very moment of flight, thus they can evade regular radar and missile defenses just like a running back who is avoiding the tackles. In the words of a defense analyst, Brandon Toliver, “Hypersonic weapons that operate at speeds beyond Mach 5 and have flight paths that are unpredictable, completely overturn the traditional missile defense ideas.” The time for warnings can be slashed to just a few minutes, thereby leaving almost no space for mistakes and increasing the decision-makers’ stakes.

Countries with functional hypersonic systems are already getting the job done. Russia’s Avangard and similar states’ new systems can be equipped with conventional or nuclear warheads, so it is hard to tell what is coming your way until it gets there. Old-fashioned tactics—traveling in predictable ballistic paths and shooting them down with ground-based missiles—just don’t work anymore.

The American Response: Building a Next-Generation Shield

Faced with this challenge, the United States is rethinking missile defense from scratch. A new executive order calls for the rapid development of a next-generation system, with inspiration from Israel’s Iron Dome scaled up to protect an entire continent. The idea is straightforward: design a multi-layer shield that can see, track, and neutralize threats of all distances, bringing together everything from ground-based interceptors to advanced sensors in space.

The defense of the U.S. is unparalleled in its difficulty. America’s not like other small nations, having to defend against short-range rockets but also long-range missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and high-speed cruise missiles. The new strategy is based on multiple layers of defense, where conventional interceptors, space-based sensors, and electronic warfare gear combine to detect and disrupt threats early.

Space-Based Defenses and Advanced Technology

Arguably, the most contentious—and ambitious—component of the plan is firing interceptors into space. These would be space-based systems that would aim to destroy missiles in their boost phase, before they can release decoys or perform difficult-to-predict maneuvers. Some enthusiasts argue it could give the U.S. near-global reach and early interception options, but also skeptics who argue it might spark an arms race in space.

The Pentagon is accelerating efforts like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor layer and building a constellation of satellites to allow persistent tracking and targeting. The concept is to combine tried-and-true missile defense methods with rapid innovation, feeding new technology into the system as it develops. Defense contractors, including the major industry players, are at the forefront of the effort, combining tried-and-true expertise with commercial innovation to build a strong and adaptable system.

Industrial Mobilization and Critical Materials

A modern missile defense system is not just about rockets and radars—it’s about materials and supply chains. New interceptors and hypersonic vehicles rely on metals and alloys that can withstand high heat and stress. A specific case in point is the metal niobium, which appears in high-temperature superalloys.

The U.S. is dependent now on imports for almost all of its niobium, which could be a vulnerability. To offset that, Washington is exploring domestic mining, foreign alliances, and strategic stockpiling to ensure certainty that production of missile defenses is not limited by access to the essential resources. Holding onto the raw materials is as crucial as deploying the interceptors themselves.

The Value of Allies and Partnerships

Missile defense in the age of hypersonic does not stop at any one nation. The U.S. is doubling its wager on cooperation with allies and industry to pool information, accelerate innovation, and leverage resources. Across the military, joint operations and interoperability are stressed very heavily, particularly in space. Brig. Gen. Don Brooks of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command emphasizes that collaboration among warfighters, industry, and allied countries is critical to staying ahead of the curve of new threats.

Internationally, the U.S. is working in close cooperation with allies such as the U.K., Australia, and Canada to develop joint missile defense technology and operating procedures. The commercial industry has an increasingly important role to play as well, helping to deploy advanced systems that are capable of adapting to emerging threats. In Brooks’ words, “Partnerships between allied nations and the U.S., combined with commercial industry support, provide a decisive technical edge in space-domain awareness.”

Adjusting to a High-Stakes Future

The advent of hypersonic missiles is forcing America to rethink its entire missile defense system—from technology and industrial capacity to alliances and operating procedures. It’s an innovation vs. adaptation game of great risk, where time is in short supply and mistakes can be calamitous. The margin for error is closing as these missiles are getting faster, smarter, and more erratic, and this is the most immediate challenge in missile defense.

On the other hand, in the deep oceans, which are invisible from the surface, the most important battles to have control over the sea are taking place without anyone seeing them. A key part of the center is the nuclear-powered attack submarine – a silent, stalking, and killing machine that can kill with one go. For many years, these ships have been the main support of U.S. naval strategy, providing the combination of stealth, great range, and powerful firepower which are unique among most of the other vessels in the fleet. Currently, in the situation where rival countries are constructing their fleets under the water, the story of American submarines, especially the Seawolf and Virginia classes, is still a saga of technology, foresight, and compromise in a changing world.

The Seawolf class emerged at the end of the Cold War as the final solution to the Soviet submarine threat. When the lead Seawolf (SSN-21) was launched in 1997, it was hailed as the world’s fastest, quietest, and most sophisticated attack sub.

Its modular construction, deep diving capability, and high sensor sophistication placed it on a pedestal. With a complement of eight torpedo tubes and a weapons-carrying capacity of as much as 50, including Tomahawk cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, it was to be used for a wide range of missions, from ice patrol to combat cruises of high threat.

The Cold War ended, but budgets contracted, and the Seawolf program was trimmed. Only three of the initial 29 submarines were constructed. As naval analyst Reuben F. Johnson noted, “Had the U.S. built all 29 Seawolf-class submarines, America’s undersea dominance today would be substantially greater.” The cuts restricted operating reach and slowed the accumulation of both technology and experienced manpower required to maintain the United States at the pinnacle of the undersea game.

Then arrived the Virginia class. More affordable but equally potent, the Virginias were multifaceted, modular, and easy to adapt to a range of missions. 23 were active in 2025, with others underway. The early models included 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes for Tomahawk missiles, but later models added significant enhancements, such as the two Virginia Payload Tubes of giant diameter in Block III, making it easier to build and increasing missile capacity.

The Block V Virginias take it even further still. With the Virginia Payload Module (VPM)—an 84-foot hull stretch containing four additional payload tubes—each sub will carry 28 additional Tomahawks, a 76% boost compared to previous designs. This will set the Block V up as the most firepower-laden U.S. attack submarine ever constructed, equivalent to the converted Ohio-class SSGNs in sheer firepower.

True, firepower is just half of it. Block V subs are designed thinking ahead, capable of putting next-generation guns on board, including hypersonic missiles. Next-generation sonar systems, such as Large Vertical Array (LVA) and Light Weight Wide Aperture Arrays (LWWAA), provide them with unmatched detection and tracking capabilities. The new Tomahawk missiles also restore anti-ship capabilities, ty as well as in classic land-attack missions, meaning these subs can address a broad spectrum of threats.

Even against other countries’ subs—such as Russia’s Yasen-M class—Virginias hold their own. Yasen-M carries more weapons in total, up to 72 torpedo-sized systems such as Kalibr, Oniks, and Zircon missiles. But Virginia Block V pushes to its limits speed, cruise missile delivery flexibility, modular payloads, and next-generation sensors, to be more versatile and technologically integrated.

The creation of these submarines is part of wider changes in naval strategy: from Cold War blue-water supremacy to multi-mission flexibility, to stealth and signal intelligence, and to the incorporation of new technologies such as unmanned systems and hypersonic missiles. The continued investment by the Navy in the Virginia class, particularly with the VPM upgrades, makes U.S. attack submarines a premier force as the underwater realm becomes increasingly crowded and contested.

The Virginia and Seawolf classes also demonstrate the power of flexibility. The Seawolf was an era piece—a state-of-the-art hunter designed for a yesterday-gone era. Virginia, on the other hand, has prospered through modularity, incremental modification, and design to meet the challenges of the future.

As the oceans grow more crowded and contested, these submarines will increasingly create undersea power, operating unseen and safeguarding U.S. interests in a domain where de facto dominance is not measured by visible fleets, but by invisible specters beneath the waves.

The history of nuclear arms control between the U.S. and Russia has always been the basis of global safety, and it is still crucial to the planet. This history dates back to the very first nuclear test in Los Alamos, New Mexico, conducted in 1945 during the Manhattan Project. The whole world was changed as a result of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed more than 100,000 people and caused Japan to capitulate. Actually, they had become the criteria for the new period, in which such atrocities as war crimes were hardly conceivable.

The Soviet Union reacted quickly to its nuclear test in Kazakhstan, which shocked American intelligence, and set out to battle to produce ever more lethal weapons. Hydrogen bombs hundreds of times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb were detonated by the United States in the early 1950s, soon followed by the Soviets. These displays of technology attested to technological superiority, but so did a history of medical exposure to radioactive poison and risk from testing sites.

When the nuclear arms race grew fierce, it had to be controlled. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in Vienna to promote civilian nuclear science and monitor nuclear installations, but applications for the military never lagged far behind the intellect. The Soviet 1957 test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, followed by the Sputnik 1 launch, infuriated American leaders and created NASA and even more zeal for the development of missiles.

Nuclear testing became commonplace by the late 1950s. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the nd United Kingdom exploded over a hundred bombs within a single year. France and numerous other nations soon joined them, bringing security to a more complicated world. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war when Soviet missiles were found in Cuba by American spies. Following thirteen sleepless nights, there was mutual comprehension to pull back missiles and establish a direct telephone link between Washington and Moscow, an umbilical cord to the handling of future crises.

This brush with disaster created arms control. The Limited Test Ban Treaty restricted nuclear explosions in the air, outer space, and the oceans, which was a manifestation of fear of fallout. The 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a cornerstone of arms control into which the overwhelming majority of states entered into renouncing nuclear weapons, though the next five—India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Sudan—were out of reach of the regime.

Détente and milestone treaties were felt during the 1970s. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) produced SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that limited missile silos and submarine-launched missiles. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, however, ended it all, suspended SALT II negotiations, and prompted the U.S. to boycott the Moscow Olympics.

The Reagan administration first expanded the nuclear capability of the United States but subsequently went on to introduce sweeping proposals like the zero option and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a plan to deploy a shield of missiles in space. They surprised Soviet leaders and resulted in summits close to removing offensive nuclear weapons, although disagreements on missile defense prevented full-fledged agreements from being signed.

But all continued. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty abolished whole classes of ground-based missiles and implemented strict verification practices. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union provided a window for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which demanded deep reductions in nuclear arms.

New difficulties arose in the post-Cold War period as well. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the former Soviet countries, were left with nuclear weapons, but Russia had declared that it would give up its nuclear arsenal and join the NPT as a non-nuclear signatory. The U.S. pledged billions to finance denuclearization. Nevertheless, the situation was such that the political and technological challenges impacted the attempts to proceed with the reduction of arsenals under START II and other agreements.

At the beginning of the 2000s, the U.S. pulled out of the ABM Treaty and started to make missile defense systems to protect against threats coming from rogue states, which were seen as dubious by Russia. The cooperative initiatives, such as the early-warning centers, never became a reality. On the other hand, the issue of arms control was still at the top of the agenda despite the failures. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) or the Moscow Treaty limited both countries from making further cuts, although it was criticized by all for its shortcomings.

The Obama administration exuded a slightly different emphasis, which was clearly reflected in the New START treaty that had binding restrictions on intercontinental nuclear missiles as its main characteristic. Apart from that, these two superpowers were still facing various tensions, such as regional conflicts and political competition, which were testing the extent of their cooperation. On the other hand, the Trump administration sent withdrawal notifications for the INF Treaty as well as the Treaty on Open Skies, citing compliance issues.

The Biden administration, most recently, only a few days before the expiry of New START, negotiated with Russia to extend it for another five years and preserve the only remaining limit on their strategic stockpiles. The nuclear arms control history between the U.S. and Russia is a witness to the fears of the competition going out of control, and the occasional, but very limited, instances of cooperation, even on the verge of nuclear war.

When the F-35 Lightning II’s stealth, low-flying, and radar-evading profile was first observed by defense analysts, it was not intuitive that the aircraft would change its shape to be one of the most heavily armed warbirds ever. However, that’s precisely the case that went on to be the story, as the pilots got to know the so-called “Beast Mode”—a setting that gives away some of the stealth characteristics but retains the total firepower—more intimately and began experimenting with it.

The tale starts with the F-35’s early stealth-design philosophy. Low observability meant the most to engineers, and weapons were all carried internally to prevent radar. The price: reduced payload capacity over predecessor aircraft like the F-16 or F/A-18.

But in weapons integration testing in 2018, something unexpected occurred. Engineers began testing external hardpoints, and the outcome surprised even veteran pilots.

Suddenly, the F-35 could carry as many as 22,000 pounds of bombs—a bombing load similar to B-52 Vietnam war missions. But not like those big, slow bombers, this fifth-generation fighter could strike its ordnance as well as engage airborne targets.

The key was the jet’s sensor fusion system, which enabled one pilot to operate two dozen precision-guided bombs and six air-to-air missiles and maintain better situational awareness than older aircraft.

Naturally, deploying bombs and missiles on the wing reduces stealth. It increases radar cross-section but less than critics could have dreamed. The enhanced electronic warfare package of the F-35 makes up for it, employing advanced jamming and signature control to remain ridiculously survivable in this “dirty” environment.

We’ve watched the capabilities of Beast Mode demonstrated in real-world exercises such as Northern Edge in Alaska. There, heavily loaded-for-bear F-35s systematically destroyed whole air defense networks designed to thwart conventional strike packages.

They bested dedicated strike fighters such as the F-15E, demonstrating that fifth-generation fighters can master both the stealth and heavy-firing dimensions of contemporary air combat.

Looking ahead, Beast Mode continues to advance. With advanced new weapons like the AIM-260 air-to-air missile and potential hypersonic integrations, this configuration ensures the F-35 will remain relevant for decades to come.

It’s a testament to the jet’s flexible design—equally deadly whether it’s sneaking unseen through enemy lines or appearing with the firepower to destroy a small airfield.

What started as a stealth demonstrator is now the most iconic strike platform in history to have flown. Beast Mode not only added another mission ability to the F-35—it changed what we can expect from a single airframe in the 21st century.

Supercarrier ships were the most powerful sea forces of the most powerful aeronaval task forces with the range and power to project to the farthest corner of the earth. Instead of an actual supercarrier, Russia chose to invest in sea-based competitors that were more than capable, thus exchanging the excess in construction for pride, ambition, and competitors. With the Ulyanovsk, a ship that could have turned Moscow’s navy into a real blue-water navy, it was basically there in the late 1980s. Probably one of the biggest “what-ifs” of history, in fact, rather than one of history’s greatest.

Ulyanovsk was built by Mykolaiv shipyard in 1988. It was assigned the codename Project 1143.7, and it was the first to make Soviet carriers as long as Soviet carriers would ever be, much like American giants of the era. Admiral Kuznetsov utilized a ski-jump off, whereas Ulyanovsk utilized steam catapults and was capable of carrying more heavily loaded flights.

At a weight of nearly 80,000 tons and a length of 324 meters, they would have been world giants among killers. With four reactors driving four turbines and a residence powered by a nuclear reactor, Ulyanovsk would have steamed at 30 knots with the sole limitation being the fatigue of the crew.

Her flight deck would have space to accommodate a total number of up to 70 aircraft, like Su-33 fighter jets, Yak-44 anti-submarines, and Ka-27 helicopters. She had P-700 Granit missiles, S-300 anti-missile systems, and close-in weapon systems for protection.

This was not the usual warship—it was a guarantee that the Soviet navy would have on the hands of the opposing carrier battle group. Political and military pragmatism were synonymous in Moscow and Ulyanovsk.

But. Its other fates were to wait. With the crash of the Soviet economy, the dream crashed along with it. Only a fourth of the 1992-constructed economy, and the new Moscow and Kyiv regime, not so money-wise—or driven—to finish it. When it reached the billions, the half-finished hull was ordered to be dismantled. The Soviet economy’s supercarrier dream was shattered on February 4, 1992.

The Ulyanovsk tragedy is the blemish of Russia. Russia currently has only one carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has been plagued by catastrophes: infernal fires during overhaul, a crane mishap that would have put a civilian ship out of action, and engine breakdown after engine breakdown.

The ship sails normally with an escort of tugboats in case of a breakdown in the middle of the ocean. Life on board Kuznetsov is drudgery and not a source of pride for most of the crew.

The Russian dream of a supercarrier remains, though. Phantasmagoric schemes like the Shtorm nuclear carrier return from time to time and in plans for modernization. But they never make it off paper, slain by austerity budgets and changing priorities. Ulyanovsk is now an aphorism of what was not done, not what was built.

The grand plan is black. Russian presence outside the world is limited in terms of a follow-on carrier. Hemisphere-scale planning is ruled out by technology, cost, and geography.

Ulyanovsk reminds us that the grand war plan can be outmatched by economic and political change. Russia is reminded of a promise unfulfilled—and repeated attempts to sustain actual navy capability—by the cancelled supercarrier.

The Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) is the only system that is more reassuring than any other one when defending a warship against sea-skimming missiles, speed-record attack boats, or cannon rounds that seem to come from nowhere. That radar-guided Gatling gun has made itself at home on U.S. Navy ships and many others, the last resort between the ship and disaster.

Phalanx was developed in the 1960s and 1970s, during which anti-ship missiles were being introduced and changing naval warfare. These low-altitude, high-speed weapons made underfunded adversaries threats to billion-dollar ships.

The Navy reacted in two ways: improve in-service missile defense and design a gun system with sufficient rounds to be fired rapidly enough to reach the threat quickly enough to destroy it singly at close ranges. The Phalanx was the gun, which was built around the M61A1 Vulcan 20mm rotary gun with the capacity for 4,500 rounds per minute firing.

Most incredible about the system is that all these abilities are integrated. Search and track radars, complex fire-control computers, and the Vulcan six-barreled gun are all included in one package. Engaged and up, it can find, chase, and kill attacking targets automatically—a task that was done before using a number of different systems and a team of men.

The M61A1 Vulcan that makes up the bulk of the system is not a standard weapon. It has electrically heated barrels that allow it to achieve highly elevated rates of fire needed to shoot at fast-flying missiles or mortar shells. Spreading the firing burden out among six barrels keeps them from overheating during short bursts of high-energy firing. It uses tungsten armor-piercing ammunition against naval targets or self-destructing rounds in its land-based C-RAM mode to reduce damage to non-combatants.

Enhanced in a series of blocks after its first deployment aboard the USS Coral Sea in 1980, Phalanx improved radar sensitivity and included added ammunition capacity in Block 1. Block 1A added processing capability, and the system could engage three targets at once. Its most notable upgrade came in the form of Block 1B, which came with a forward-looking infrared sensor and operator control stations for use in manual targeting to strengthen its ability to intercept missiles, helicopters, small boats, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

The system has consistently demonstrated itself on the battlefield. During the Gulf War, it successfully intercepted dozens of incoming missiles. In ground operations, the C-RAM variant also defended bases from rocket and mortar attacks, with success rates as high as 70 to 80 percent. Its ability to act seconds after detecting saved thousands of lives and defended irreplaceable equipment.

Incorporation into greater combat systems only enhances its functionality. Phalanx is designed to operate either independently or in concert with the combined defense of the ship, cooperating with other systems like Rolling Airframe Missile. Layered defense is needed in today’s conflict, where any single system would be incapable of defending against all threats. Directed-energy gear continues to evolve, but the Phalanx is a necessary prompt-response guardian.

There are, of course, weaknesses in the system. It has a short range, effectively a “last line of defense.” Ammo is rapidly depleted during battle, and regular maintenance needs to be performed to maintain it in combat condition. Its small size and self-contained design, however, make it easy to install, a big reason why it is still so popular.

Cost is another reason that Phalanx has persisted. Even after it’s become more costly to produce year by year, the system’s still much cheaper per encounter than missiles. It’s costing around 300 rounds at around $8,000 to conduct an average intercept—a fraction of the cost of even the cheapest guided missile, but very probably as good at stopping close-in threats.

With new missile technology and new tactics, the Phalanx CIWS is still an elephant gun. Automation, rate of fire, and flexibility make it a reliable defender of the fleet—a tribute to fine balancing between sea attack and defense.