Since early 2024, the war between Russia and Ukraine has taken a new turn—one not only characterized by front-line combat, but by a daily roster of Ukrainian drone and missile attacks deep inside Russian territory. The targets are Russian oil refineries, fuel depots, and supply routes—the blood supply that fuels its war machine. This tactic signals a wide-ranging shift in the conduct and perception of the war, with consequences radiating far beyond the front.
Ukrainian tactics have changed rapidly. Initially, as it was itself deeply involved in fighting, its distant strikes were typically confined to military installations close to the front, partly due to Western restrictions on weaponry assistance. But as the conflict persisted and sanctions did not effectively chill Russian oil income, Ukraine increasingly turned to locally produced drones and missiles. Unencumbered by the limitation of overseas bounds, weapons produced in the country enabled Kyiv to strike targets hundreds and even more than thousands of kilometers within Russia. This enabled Ukraine to physically hit Russian energy infrastructure instead of merely using economic sanctions.
The scope of these operations is immense. In the first months of 2025, no fewer than 81 Russian oil facilities were hit by Ukrainian drones. In the first part of 2025, the campaign reached new heights as an estimated 10 percent of Russia’s refining capacity was taken offline. Refineries and oil storage tanks were targeted down to pumping stations and ports, as far away as Moscow, Engels air base, and Izhevsk—more than 1,300 kilometers from the front.
The economic and operational effect is twofold. On the negative side, the loss is enormous. Between 2024 September and 2025 February, Ukrainian attacks inflicted at least 60 billion rubles’ worth of losses (approximately $714 million), knocking down dozens of tanks. A single major raid in Feodosia, Crimea, destroyed 11 tanks with a combined capacity of 69,000 cubic meters, causing damage worth more than 3.3 billion rubles ($39 million).
Russian refineries had to cut output, gasoline and diesel production fell, and fuel prices increased. Refining was more than 12 percent shut down temporarily, a 12-year low. The government responded by halting production statistics publication and banning fuel exports temporarily to stabilize domestic prices.
Its overall economic impact on Russia has been less than anticipated. Russia’s refining capabilities are over twice its domestic consumption. Even when 10–15 percent of that capability is shut down, it is enough to cover its internal demands supplemented by Belarus if needed. The majority of the fiscal costs fall on the oil majors that incur losses in the form of repair expenses and lost profits, while the state budget is relatively secure. Losses on refined product exports are partly offset by the export of crude, though at lower margins of profit.
Operationally, the raids have a strategic overextension. Russia will have to divert resources to defend a scattered network of essential infrastructure, extending its thin air defense. The government has stationed Pantsir air defense and mounted anti-drone shielding at some refineries, but patchy coverage exists. With 38 refineries in operation and dozens more under construction or planned, it’s not possible to defend each plant at the same time.
The technology has been revolutionary. Cheap, accurate navigation systems, satellite-linked remote controllers, and the ability to buy high-resolution satellite pictures have enabled Ukraine to hit with otherworldly accuracy hundreds of kilometers from home. Cheap, miniature drones are now able to destroy billion-dollar buildings, and the psychological effect of bringing the war to Russian soil is as important as material destruction.
Strategically, both sides are evolving. Russia has also increased its attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, with power plants and refineries as the focus of more targeted attacks. The war is increasingly obfuscating the distinction between military and economic targets, getting the war ever-nearer to full-on war pace. At the same time, local Ukrainian production of missiles and drones, supported and subsidized by Western money and technology, is the foundation of defense in the face of uncertainty surrounding future military aid to Kyiv.
The global context is also relevant. America has periodically pressured Ukraine to constrain Russian energy targets strikes to prevent global oil market shocks and escalation risks. Cease-fire proposals and suspensions have been made on occasion, but deep strikes persist as long as Russian oil revenues fund the war effort. Kyiv sees these attacks as one of the few levers for imposing actual costs for the Kremlin.
Ukraine’s struggle with Russian energy interests is a demonstration of the evolving nature of 21st-century conflict. It demonstrates how technology advancements, asymmetrical warfare, and economic coercion can influence strategy, though in defiance of the reality that short-term damage is not determinative. The conflict is no longer localized to the east of Ukraine; it now spills over into Russian industrial heartlands, international oil markets, and policymakers’ thinking everywhere. For historians and defence analysts, the central question is less the material impact than how such strikes re-order war, deterrence, and resilience logic in an age of ongoing conflict.