The Littoral Combat Ship, abbreviated as LCS, was initially promoted as the next generation naval combat vehicle – a smart, versatile, modular ship capable of performing any task from clearing mines to fighting submarines, and at a cost that was only a fraction of that of traditional ships. However, after 20 years, the LCS story has become a warning message: a project that had great ideas on paper but turned out to be costly and, most importantly, empty-handed for the Navy in terms of accomplishing tasks.
The US Navy started the LCS program in the early 2000s, at a time when the Navy fleet was shrinking, and the retirement of numerous Cold War-era ships was imminent. The concept was straightforward: design a small, multi-mission combatant that could be quickly and cheaply made, take over the low-end missions while the larger ships concentrate on the high-end wars. Defense officials were aiming for a target price of roughly $400 million per ship—about one-third of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
The unique feature of the LCS was its modularity. In addition, the ships were designed with a minimum number of crew members, which is less than half of the standard frigate; thus, the vessels relied on automation and the use of unmanned vehicles. As then-deputy defense secretary Bob Work stated, the concept was daring and unproven, a complete departure from the usual naval ship design.
But the desire to push forward outpaced available resources. The Navy steamed ahead with the LCS to production before there was a complete plan, bypassing many of the customary testing and evaluation phases. The first LCS went into service in 2008, years sooner than the typical Pentagon acquisition schedule. Bryan Clark of the Hudson Institute says the Navy’s urgency to innovate left few with the stomach to say “no” to added requirements as the program grew more complex.
Issues soon arose. The mission packages, long espoused as the LCS’s signature strength, were complicated to implement and frequently behind schedule. The anti-submarine package encountered sonar deployment problems, minesweeping systems fell behind schedule, and hull designs experienced transmission problems and cracking under high speeds—a critical issue for vessels designed to be fast-moving. Efforts to cycle specialized crews between ships also didn’t pan out, detracting from operational effectiveness.
The costs escalated way over what was originally projected. Although the Navy was aiming to stay within the $250 million limit for each of the ships, the actual cost went beyond $500 million for each vessel, and that with no account taken for the expensive mission packages. The administration that was backing the idea of these ships financially went along with the plan to buy in bulk both the Freedom and Independence classes. But because of the following troubles, such as technical issues, maintenance difficulties, and performance problems, the program would eventually face very bad consequences. By the time it came to 2016, there was only one solution left, which was a complete inspection due to the continuous failures of the engines; however, the program’s fame was already affected.
During that time, the strategic landscape was shifting. The LCS was designed for near-shore “brown water” operations, but China’s expanding anti-access, area denial capabilities made those missions more and more perilous. Several LCSs were retired after fewer than five years—far less than their planned 25-year life.
Experts calculated that the premature retirement accounted for about $7 billion in lost service time, not counting billions more in operating expenses that the Navy saved by retiring the ships.
For others, the choice to cut losses was painful but necessary. Former naval officer Bryan McGrath said maintaining the ships in commission would have been more expensive and less effective, especially in a possible high-end war. The American Enterprise Institute’s Mackenzie Eaglen noted the high yearly operating expenses—about $70 million per vessel—as another basis for why early retirement was financially astute.
However, the program was not a complete failure. The minesweeping package did finally achieve operational status, and in doing so performed a world-first by employing unmanned vehicles to sweep out minefields.
In the end, the LCS saga is a lesson that naval innovation is an exercise in balance, between striving for what is best and staying grounded in reality. Without hard testing, precise requirements, and an open mind to change in the face of changing threats, even the best ideas can become costly lessons. As one congressional staffer explained it, the Navy might have caught on to the LCS’s faults too late, but learning from them will be essential for what comes next for the fleet.