
If you’ve been watching the war in Ukraine, you might have seen Soviet-era tanks—T-54s and T-55s—being pulled out of Russian storage facilities, loaded onto trains, and shipped to the front lines. A few years ago, this would have been surreal, but now, these Cold War dinosaurs are again in service. Why is Russia deploying museum artifacts onto the battlefield, and what does this tell us about contemporary war?

The solution starts with attrition. The invasion by Russia has become a long, drawn-out war of resources, with both sides expending huge amounts of manpower and hardware. Open-source intelligence communities approximate that Russia has lost thousands of tanks since the beginning of the war.

The Dutch organization Oryx documents more than 3,500 Russian tanks destroyed, with some Ukrainian sources placing it even higher. Manufacture of new tanks, such as the T-9.0, has fallen behind these losses, compelling Russia to have to go deep into reserves and produce vehicles from the late 1940s and early 1950s.

These T-54 and T-55 tanks are so vintage that some of them can be seen in museums or as filming props. Indeed, Russia’s largest movie studio, Mosfilm, recently provided dozens of tanks and armored vehicles from its prop stock to the military.

Mosfilm’s director general, Karen Shakhnazarov, delivered 28 T-55 tanks, eight PT-76 tanks, and other armored vehicles to President Vladimir Putin, commenting, “I knew that they needed them.” Once preserved for filming, the vehicles suddenly gained new worth on the battlefield.

The choice to deploy these tanks is as much about quantity as it is quality. Russia’s defense sector has been under pressure to keep up with orders, burdened by Western sanctions limiting its ability to procure cutting-edge electronics and components.

Trevor Taylor of the Royal United Services Institute described how Russian industry is “really suffering from the restrictions,” citing stories of chips salvaged from home appliances to keep weapon systems operational. It is quicker to refurbish old tanks than to produce new ones, so it is a pragmatic option in the short run.

These tanks are not, however, being deployed as frontline spearheads. The T-54 and T-55 are no match for advanced Western tanks such as the Leopard 2, Challenger 2, and Abrams. Historian John Delaney from the Imperial War Museum pointed out that in previous conflicts, Western tanks were able to knock out T-55s from distances of over 20 kilometers.

The older T-55 tanks are missing recent armor, fire control, night-fighting equipment, and the capability to shoot accurately while moving. A T-55 would not have much of a chance in a one-on-one battle with a new tank.

So how are they used? Russian commanders have learned to improvise, employing these tanks in fixed defensive positions. Rather than moving forward over open ground, T-54s and T-55s are often dug into fighting positions with only turrets exposed, serving more like fixed artillery or pillboxes.

This brings them down to more viable targets and enables them to act as covering fire for Russia’s deep defense lines, especially as Ukraine prepares counterattacks with armor provided by NATO. Robert Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, notes that most of these systems will be employed in rear sectors and will fire from a distance rather than charge.

Another advantage is simplicity. The T-55 is easy to operate and maintain, which suits Russia’s conscript-heavy army. As Delaney points out, “If you’ve got a lot of conscripts coming into your army, it’s easier and quicker to train them on these than on more modern battle tanks.” In a war where rapid replacement of losses is critical, ease of use can be a major factor.

This return of vintage hardware is only one aspect of a larger story of attrition warfare. Russia resorted to massed formations, layered defense positions, and artillery bombardments to stem Ukrainian advances.

Drones and electronic warfare have helped Russian forces detect and target Ukrainian forces and jam communications, and counter-drone operations. But Russia’s air force remains weak, being unable to achieve strategic air superiority or reliably strike Ukrainian infrastructure.

In contrast, Ukraine gets a steady stream of Western aid, including modern tanks, air defense systems, and NATO training. The contrast in gear, training, and doctrine is telling. NATO soldiers are trained for advanced combined-arms battles, capable of blinding and disabling units early. Russia, in contrast, has had to make do, relying more on numbers and defense than technological advantage.

Does that render tanks unnecessary? Not by any stretch. The Ukrainian conflict has proven that tanks remain essential but that their utility is context-dependent. Russia’s early heavy losses were due to poor planning, lack of infantry support, and logistical hiccups.

Rob Lee of King’s College London argues that tanks continue to be priceless in modern war and that their vulnerabilities are overstated. Used in concert with infantry, artillery, and air power, tanks continue to be a force multiplier.

The lesson is that it is impossible for technology to win wars on its own. The sighting of T-54 and T-55 tanks indicates the ongoing validity of mass, logistics, and flexibility. Old equipment will even work if it is employed properly. That said, when pitted against modern Western armor and tactics, the limitations of such old tanks become painfully obvious.

While the war continues, the destiny of Russia’s vintage tanks will prove the balance between quality and quantity in modern warfare. The history of the T-54 and T-55 is more than just nostalgia—it is a reminder of the harsh realities of war, in which every single resource counts and lessons of history are being taught on the battlefield.