Essentially, the Navy was looking to the A-12 Avenger II to be their next generation, a stealthy, enigmatic, carrier-launched attack aircraft that could go around all sorts of anti-measures and still hit the enemy’s land hard. By the late ’80s, the A-6 Intruder, which had been the Navy’s loyal friend for quite a long time, was getting old, and the increasingly dangerous threats from the Cold War period were asking for a fighter that could survive a radar-guided missile and a tightly integrated air defense system kind of world.
That challenge spawned the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program. The mission: create a next-generation carrier-capable stealth attack aircraft.
The Air Force had already amazed the world with the F-117 Nighthawk, and the Navy desired its ace of stealth. In 1988, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics were given the contract, and the A-12 Avenger II idea took to the skies, at least on paper.
The shape stood out as sharp and daring: a triangle-like wing they called “Flying Dorito.” It held weapons inside to stay off radar, was made with new, strong materials, and had paint that hid it from radar. Inside were two crew members, a top new flight tech, ground-reading radar, and war electronics gear. It could fight far out, over 900 sea miles away, much more than what came before it.
But translating that promise into a functional aircraft turned out to be much more difficult than anticipated. Combining stealth needs with the special stresses of carrier takeoffs and landings turned into a serious engineering problem. The weight of the plane ballooned beyond early estimates, threatening to make it unsafe for carrier use. Experimental materials and production methods added more delays and technical nuisances.
The secrecy of the program did not aid it. As a secret “black” project, it was exempt from usual oversight, so Congress and the Pentagon were not fully aware of the extent of the problems. The contractors, wanting to maintain confidence at high levels, minimized problems. Navy officials, not wanting to risk killing the program, did the same.
Its costs skyrocketed. The initial $4.8 billion development cost ballooned to close to $11 billion with an eye-popping estimated cost of more than $165 million per plane. In early 1991, the A-12 was behind schedule by 18 months, billions of dollars over budget, and still not flight-ready.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney eventually canceled it in January of that year, bringing to an end what proved to be the largest Pentagon contract cancellation in history. The sole A-12 ever to exist was a full-scale mockup.
The end was a mess. For more than 20 years, a big fight went on in court between the state and the builders until it finished in 2014.
The Navy, now without the A-6, had to use the F/A-18 Hornet and later the Super Hornet to do the job. It took a while, but the stealth F-35C finally showed up on ship decks. Yet, it was not the bomber A-12 was meant to be.
Now, the A-12 Avenger II stands as a big warning in U.S. military flight tales. It showed the risks of pushing too far with new tech, handling hard tasks incorrectly, and hiding too much.
Although the “Flying Dorito” was never airborne, its story has changed the way the Pentagon supervises the development of large weapons projects, leading to tighter regulations and more realistic targets before investing in a new cutting-edge aircraft.
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