When Russia unveiled the Su-75 “Checkmate” stealth fighter, it was touted as a revolutionary machine—a clean, cheap fifth-generation aircraft designed to compete with the U.S. F-35 and make stealth within the reach of smaller countries. But in mid-2025, that promise appears to be an unfulfilled dream rather than an airpower breakthrough. The Checkmate is a sign of what Russia hopes to achieve with fifth-generation airpower—and the numerous obstacles that stand in its path.
Upon initial observation, the design and specifications of Checkmate are awe-inspiring. It is a stealth light fighter single-engine jet, capable of accelerating to Mach 1.8 speed, and its range for combat is around 3,000 kilometers, and its weapons-burden weight is up to seven tons. Its avionics modularity, AI-supported flight systems, and ability to carry different types of missiles and bombs were aimed at attracting those air forces that were not willing to afford sky-high prices with such flexibility. Priced to cost between $30–40 million per plane, Checkmate offered performance and stealth at less than half the cost of Western jets.
But under the glossy presentations and showy rollouts, progress has moved slowly. Ever since its widely covered debut at the MAKS 2021 air show, the aircraft has remained stationary as a work of art. Sukhoi and United Aircraft Corporation still discuss future milestones and production targets, but those keep getting delayed further.
The shortage of buyers is one of the biggest reasons for that. The Checkmate was aimed at markets like the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia—countries in which high-tech airplanes are attractive but Western equivalents are financially or politically out of reach. Pre-order interest had been expressed by countries like the UAE, Nigeria, Algeria, and India, but none have gone beyond those talks with purchases. And despite all the publicity stunts, from cologne-unadorned contests at air shows to logos draped over aircraft, no one seems willing to write a check. As one observer wryly put it, “Everybody wants to see it, but nobody wants to pay for it.”
And then there is the issue of sanctions. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s supply of advanced materials—Western electronics especially—was severely disrupted. That hurt particularly hard at aerospace work because new fighters rely on accurate chips, sensors, and composites. That pinch has slowed engineering and pushed primary production an even more daunting hill to climb. Even presuming a customer appeared tomorrow, the question is, can Russia even produce?
At the same time, the conflict in Ukraine has re-prioritized Moscow’s defense spending. Funds, troops, and resources have been redirected into short-term battlefield applications—drones, bullets, and missiles—and fewer into long-term ventures such as the Su-75. Building a new stealth fighter is not only costly; it requires consistent focus and industrial equanimity, which Russia cannot spare.
Making matters more difficult is the way war itself is changing. In contemporary warfare, old-fashioned dogfights are a throwback. Long-range missiles, drones, and electronic warfare occupy the skies and leave costly manned aircraft vulnerable and out of date. Most militaries are splitting their budgets between unmanned platforms, which are less costly and faster to deploy. This change in war-fighting strategy erodes Checkmate’s selling point, as its value proposition—low-cost manned stealth—is on the way out because unmanned combat aircraft are on the increase.
In order to be in a position to support the project, Russia has attempted to attract foreign partners. Earlier, an indication of cooperation in composite materials and avionics was given in talks with the UAE, and Sukhoi has offered joint production and technology transfer to India. India’s self-reliance fighter development program and previous disillusionments from joint ventures, however, have dampened interest. Added to this is always the threat of secondary sanctions for being too close to Russian defense ventures.
There were earlier rumors that Belarus might join the project to assist in production and assembly. Theoretically, it could somehow provide some industrial assistance, but its aerospace capabilities are extremely weak, and sanctions render large-scale cooperation impossible. As of now, such plans resemble ideals rather than real opportunities.
Finally, the Su-75 Checkmate is a testament to how far ambition and reality can be apart. It ticks all the boxes in theory—stealth, speed, range, affordability—but on the ground, it’s a very different story. Budgetary constraints, changing priorities, and the flexibility of war have put the Checkmate on hold, an idea that’s full of promise but devoid of achievement thus far.
For now, it is both a warning and a testament. The Checkmate demonstrates that raw technical skill and determination are not enough to bring about a next-generation fighter—timing, diplomacy, and the hard math of defense are required as well. Concepts can fill a hangar, but making them squadrons requires a lot more.