For a long period, Boeing was considered the best in the field of aviation. Their aircraft were not only vehicles but, in fact, symbols of American engineering–trusted, loved, and used all over the globe. Pilots and passengers used to say a lot: “If it’s not a Boeing, I won’t get on the plane.” This kind of trust was not a matter of one day; it was a matter of a long time of performance and design, both reliable and safe. However, a reputation made over several generations has been gradually chipped away by a series of accidents, ‘near misses,’ and disturbing investigations that uncover not only the company’s culture but also its manufacturing practice and the way the regulatory body is overseeing the company.
One very recent event, although it ended peacefully, still pointed out how vulnerable Boeing’s reputation has grown. A flight to Portland was terrifying, though the landing was safe, leaving both the passengers and the crew nervous. Instead of emphasizing a sad truth, the situation should have been normal; Boeing’s quality was no longer taken for granted. The NTSB’s report after the incident indicated that even the FAA had not identified the source of the production flaws, suggesting the doubts not only of Boeing but also of the agency in charge of aviation safety.
The tragedy of that kind brought back to the memories of many people the disasters of the 737 MAX in 2018 and 2019. Those crashes that caused 346 people to lose their lives halted the fleet all over the world for nearly two years and continue to be the turning point in the history of the air industry. It turned out that Boeing had equipped the airplane with new software called MCAS to fix the aerodynamic issue of the MAX design, but only a few details had been disclosed to the pilots and the authorities. When some internal company emails were found later, where the jet was called “designed by clowns, supervised by monkeys,” it let the company culture change from engineer excellence to something less comforting.
The source of the issue lies even before the MAX program. In the late 1990s, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas mergers took place, with a different mindset -cost-cutting and the shareholders’ profits were the priority rather than the achievements of the engineering team. Soon, executives from financial backgrounds, many of whom were from industries like General Electric, started to replace the seasoned engineering managers, who had controlled Boeing’s decision-making for a long time. The move of corporate headquarters out of Seattle, which went first to Chicago and then to Washington, D.C., only widened the difference between leadership and the factory. What used to be an industry led by engineers and manufacturers had become one dominated by the numbers.
Regulation had its fingers in it also. The FAA, under programs like the Organization Designation Authorization, had allowed Boeing to go through the whole process of certification by itself. Regulators were often not strict enforcers but partners instead. Such a tight bond turned out to be catastrophic when the MAX crisis happened. Other countries went ahead and grounded the planes immediately, while the FAA stayed behind and only took action when it was impossible to deny the facts. Congressional hearings that followed exposed that Boeing had concealed crucial flight data, and even internal FAA studies were warning of the possibility of more accidents, but these were ignored.
More recently, the door plug failure on an Alaska Airlines flight highlighted how manufacturing lapses can be just as dangerous as flawed design. Investigators discovered missing bolts that should have secured the door plug, suggesting not only mistakes on the assembly line but also inadequate documentation and oversight. For Boeing, it was another blow to its credibility, and for regulators, another wake-up call. In response, the FAA grounded MAX 9 aircraft with similar configurations and began a sweeping review of Boeing’s production systems.
The American industry still makes things more difficult by having Boeing in its particular position. As the country’s biggest aerospace exporter and a pillar of its defense sector, the company has a lot of influence on Washington. With government-backed financing for foreign sales and strong political support from different administrations, Boeing has been kept away from the kind of thorough checks that smaller companies have faced. According to critics, this dynamic has led to the company benefiting from the condition of regulatory capture, where the economic importance of the company gives it protection from the consequences of repetitive failure.
The crisis has affected the entire aviation industry in the sense that the airlines have had to pay for it with groundings that caused them huge losses, and the delay of their deliveries. Passengers are now paying much more attention to the kind of aircraft that they are going to travel by, which was something that they used to take for granted before.
Airbus, one of the competitors of Boeing, has taken advantage of the crisis that the latter is going through by acquiring more of the market that is leaving Boeing’s customers to look for the stability of their airline. However, the lessons in defense procurement have also traveled beyond commercial aviation as the balancing between cost-cutting and engineering rigor is being tested in projects that directly impact the country’s security.
It will take a long time and a lot of effort to regain the trust of the people. Boeing should transform itself into a company with the trademarks with which it has become very popular – quality engineering without compromise, safety as the priority above everything else, and a corporate culture that is respectful to its employees.
It goes without saying that independent supervision needs to be enhanced and not weakened, and the confidence of the public can only be regained by the successful completion of flights one by one. The consequences are far-reaching as they go further than just profits or losses. Passenger safety in the future, America’s leadership in aviation, and the robustness of its manufacturing base are all dependent on whether Boeing can find its way back to what it once stood for.