When a normal man or woman on the street thinks of an F-35A Lightning II flight, the image that comes to mind is a stealth mission, the use of very advanced avionics, and air combat of the high-tech era. However, the story that is unfolding at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska is quite different, a short ice-coated landing gear causing a very small $196.5 million fighter plane to be saved from crashing into the ground. And that is exactly what happened at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska, a warning that in the world of military aviation, one error equals disaster.
On January 28, 2025, a 355th Fighter Squadron of the 354th Fighter Wing aircraft departed on what would be an ordinary training mission. The A-10 and F-35 pilot had hundreds of hours of experience in the air, so he expected nothing out of the ordinary. But extremely low temperatures of a mere one degree below zero, and a long ground idle time of about 40 minutes created conditions far from the usual.
Soon after takeoff, the nose gear would not retract. When the pilot attempted to lower it again, the wheel was stuck in an awkward position. That alone was a cruel risk, particularly if he might ever need to land in a hurry on the arresting gear system of the runway.
The pilot and wingman circled the airfield for an hour at 9,500 feet, executing the emergency checklists. They were also on a live call with five engineers at Lockheed Martin, including landing gear specialists, a software specialist, and a safety specialist. They went through every potential repair to realign the gear and provide the pilot with a safe landing.
The probe eventually found the cause: polluted hydraulic fluid. Approximately 30 percent of the fluid associated with the landing gear contained water contamination, and at subzero Alaskan temperatures, that water froze in the struts. The ice prevented the gear from retracting or extending fully, effectively grounding the plane in a life-threatening middle position.
Ironically, it was the same sophisticated automation systems that were meant to make the F-35 safer that led to the peril. The aircraft uses Weight on Wheels sensors to decide if it is on or off the ground. Since the landing gear was not operational, the sensors provided false indications, which misled the flight control system into believing the aircraft was on the ground. So, the software of the jet shifted to “ground mode,” took control from the pilot’s command, and made the jet pitch and violently oscillate.
The pilot tried landing twice by touch-and-go maneuvers to shake the nose gear into place. Both tries were unsuccessful. In the second try, the left main gear also froze, thus establishing beyond any reasonable doubt to the computer of the jet that it was solidly on the ground. When the pilot lost control, he had to eject only 372 feet above the strip. The F-35, now out of control, passed 3,000 feet before stalling and crashing into a fireball explosion, which was photographed and distributed far and wide later on.
More excavation revealed even more issues. Maintenance reports indicated hydraulic fluid drums with water and solids of more than double the allowed amount. Equipment was not covered, pumps were exposed, and there was no trained hazardous material supervisor in charge of the operation. The board inquiry determined that a “general lack of discipline” had permeated maintenance practices.
Most infuriatingly, a pre-advisory from Lockheed Martin about cold-weather risk to F-35 Weight on Wheels sensors had gone unnoticed by the crew on that day. Otherwise, a full-stop landing or even a pre-emptive ejection may have been the selected option, preempting the dramatic crash.
The crash reminds us how unforgiving adverse weather can be. Alaska’s cold converted what could have been a run-of-the-mill maintenance mistake into one of life and death. It also reminded us how the technological complexity of systems, such as the F-35’s automation systems, can be deceived by something as ordinary as ice within hydraulics. Aside from the high-tech technology, it served to remind us of the importance of meticulous care, extreme storage conditions, and rigorous supervision.
The class is not confined to a lone base or nation. Any air force that flies the F-35 in ice or snow weather now must take its maintenance procedures, sensor reliability, and emergency procedures to task. While this was the fleet’s first such occurrence, investigators cautioned that it can happen again unless the underlying causes are eliminated. The accident serves as a sobering reminder that with contemporary aircraft operations, it takes only a microscopic degree of error—such as a small amount of water in the wrong place—to alter everything.