The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was touted as the future of the U.S. Navy—a fleet of fast, modular ships to control coastlines, replace old frigates, and offer flexible firepower where it was most needed. Instead, it’s become the ultimate cautionary tale of how a grand military vision can go astray, generating a mountain of expense and a fleet of ships struggling to meet their purpose.
The program started in the early 2000s, when the Navy was struggling to set a post–Cold War mission. “Network-centric warfare” was the mantra, with its promise of an interconnected fleet in which small, fast, lightly crewed ships could serve as high-tech nodes in a huge battle network. The idea was straightforward: create ships that could exchange mission modules—surface warfare, mine hunting, or anti-submarine missions—in the field. With a core complement of only 40 sailors and a few extras for each mission package, these vessels would be much less manpower-intensive than the 200-man crews on traditional frigates.
Two different ships were put into production: Lockheed Martin’s steel-hulled Freedom-class and General Dynamics and Austal USA’s aluminum trimaran Independence-class. The Navy’s vision was ambitious—74 ships costing roughly $212 million each. But as the delays and issues accumulated, the order was reduced to 35 ships, and the overall price exploded to $28 billion.
Since the beginning, the LC has been plagued with mechanical malfunctions, propulsion problems, and questions about whether it is survivable in high-risk combat areas. Pentagon testers have said its survivability was suspect and its cyber defense untested. Reliability was also an issue—both classes broke down often and sat in port for lengthy periods for maintenance. The Freedom-class took the worst of it, beset by repeated powertrain issues and poor fuel efficiency, leading the Navy to prematurely retire many after just a handful of years.
The Independence-class wasn’t immune—maintenance issues, rust, and continual replacement of sacrificial anodes. The Navy discovered that hard-learned lessons from previous warships didn’t necessarily apply to these non-traditional designs. Even the highly-promoted modular mission packages were years behind schedule and disappointing when they finally did materialize.
Behind closed doors, defense industry and political interests propped up the LCS program longer than perhaps its performance would have dictated. Contractors lobbied hard, threatening Congress with catastrophe if the ships were canceled, claiming it would decimate shipyards and cost thousands of jobs. Lawmakers, under pressure to safeguard local economies, frequently supported the program in spite of growing reservations.
The cost to the budget has been staggering. The Government Accountability Office estimated lifetime operating expenses of the intended LCS fleet at over $60 billion, twice the amount it took to construct them. In 2023, Austal USA, the constructor of the Independence-class, confessed to an accounting scheme to conceal real costs and exaggerate profits. The company paid $24 million in penalties, but the damage to public trust was much more severe.
The LCS is hardly the sole cautionary story of recent U.S. defense history. The Navy’s next-generation Zumwalt-class destroyer contracted from 32 to three, for $12.8 billion apiece, and is still searching for a coherent mission. The F-35 fighter program continues as the most costly weapons system in history, hobbled by technical issues and stratospheric maintenance prices. The Army’s Future Combat System ran through $8 billion before it was canceled outright.
These errors have tangible effects. The active fleet of the Navy has decreased from 318 vessels in 2000 to 238 today. The Air Force combat aircraft inventory has closely approached being cut in half over the same timeframe. The U.S. armed forces are paying more but receiving less, while readiness and capabilities pay the price.
Now, the Navy is banking on the Constellation-class frigate, which is a variant of a tried-and-true European design. But even before the first ship has been finished, delays and budget increases are creeping into the picture, driven by U.S.-specific changes that erode the advantage of utilizing an established plan.
The LCS fiasco is a cautionary tale for defense planners: technological zeal meeting political urgency and industrial self-interest can produce a fleet of warships that fall short, at a price the country can’t bear. As defense spending approaches $1.5 trillion per year, the imperative for strategic restraint, good program management, and actual accountability has never been more compelling.
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