The Su-57 “Felon” is Russia’s most ambitious attempt to join the ranks of the elite nations that fly true fifth-generation fighters—a club thus far led by the U.S. with its F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II. The Su-57, touted as the future mainstay of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), was constructed to provide stealth, radical maneuverability, and state-of-the-art avionics. On paper, it’s a masterpiece. In reality, the journey has been much bumpier.
At its very foundation lies Russia’s long-standing focus on agility and short-range dogfighting—a practice dating back to the Cold War strategies. The Su-57 comes with thrust-vectoring engines, supercruise, and a more advanced sensor suite. The export variant Su-57E, as presented by Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), comes with an AESA radar, electro-optical targeting subsystems, and an AI-driven weapon management system.
Its take-off weight can be up to 35,000 kg, its speed about 2,600 km/h, and its operating height 20,000 meters. It is capable of carrying a mix of guided air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles as well as a 30 mm gun. One of the more innovative aspects of Su-57 production is the use of augmented reality (AR) on the shop floor.
Technicians at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant employ AR headsets to project digital instructions onto actual parts, which ensures more precise installation and reduces reliance on paper manuals. The practice—similar to processes in the F-35 program—is intended to improve quality control and protect against damaging the stealth shape of the jet.
However, the system remains under development, and its full integration into regular production remains in the works. For all its cutting-edge ambitions, the Su-57 program has been plagued by glacial production rates, shifting priorities, and concerns about performance. Fewer than an estimated 30 aircraft were believed to be operational as of mid-2025, and the actual number ready for frontline duty is likely lower, considering battle damage, maintenance downtime, and the slow assembly rate.
The initial 2019 goal for 76 airframes remains unrealized. Ongoing concerns include the necessity to continue producing tested aircraft such as the Su-30SM2 and Su-35S to counter heavy wartime losses, sanctions that restrict access to high-end electronics, and continued development of the upgraded Su-57M with better engines and avionics.
The first combat deployment of the fighter wasn’t against Ukraine, but in Syria in February 2018. Two planes flew briefly out of Khmeimim Air Base, conducting reconnaissance and air-to-ground attack, though the deployment seemed as much a sales demonstration to foreign clients as an actual operational test.
Ukraine has been a more serious testing ground, though. Information from Ukrainian, Russian, and Western sources indicates that Su-57s have made repeated attacks, predominantly from standoff distances, to neutralize Kyiv’s air defenses.
Su-57s were seen attacking the Lviv region with long-range missiles such as the Kh-69 cruise missile that can target 400 km away in September 2024. The aircraft’s battlefield footprint, however, has been minimal, partly due to its small numbers, partly due to the fact that losing one would be politically embarrassing and expensive militarily.
That threat is not theoretical. In June 2024, a mangled Su-57 was spotted with satellite imagery at one of its bases near Ukraine, presumably struck by a Ukrainian missile or drone. The aircraft suffered shrapnel damage to both nose and tail. Repair was feasible but sluggish—each lost or grounded Su-57 is a huge blow to the already tiny operational fleet.
Export opportunities have been warily optimistic. Algeria ordered 14 Su-57Es in 2021 with deliveries continuing through 2027. Other nations—from the Middle East to Southeast Asia—have expressed interest, but few have committed. India, originally a development partner, pulled out in 2018 due to concerns with cost, performance, and timing. The decision was an expression of skepticism about whether the Su-57 could compete against Western fifth-generation stealth, networking, and missile capabilities.
Critics cite a number of flaws: stealth capabilities more akin to an advanced fourth-generation fighter than an actual stealth aircraft, sensor systems with reduced range and resolution compared to U.S. counterparts, and an armament package still in part under development. Sanctions, budget pressures, and demands of the war in Ukraine have only compounded these issues.
Despite that, the Su-57 is still a powerful symbol of Russian aerospace ambition. Deploying it in Ukraine—even in a limited capacity—indicates a desire to thrust cutting-edge systems into combat. But it also highlights the disconnect between political rhetoric and operational reality.
The Su-57 is a tale of ambition held back by economics, manufacturing capability, and the dictates of contemporary warfare.
Russia will continue to construct them, gradually, and the world will continue to observe to determine if the Felon can one day hold its own among the world’s top-tier, —continue more in the way of a showpiece than as a game-changer.